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CAPABILITIES-BASED FORCE AND ARMY FORCE STRUCTURE: CAN WE SUPPORT THE OBJECTIVES OUTLINED IN THE QDR?
During the Presidential debates leading to the 2000 Presidential elections, both
Presidential candidate George W. Bush and Vice Presidential candidate Dick Cheney promised to end the perceived misuse of American forces by being more selective in committing them.
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During the mid-to late nineties, U.S. Army forces were committed to all reaches of the globe for deterrence (Multinational Force, Sinai 1996 -980 soldiers) , peacekeeping (Joint Endeavor, Bosnia-Herzegovina 1995 -23,000 soldiers), and humanitarian assistance (Support Hope, Rwanda 1994 -1,100) . 2 In the United States they were being used to assist in disaster relief and fighting forest fires, among other things.
As the events following 11 September 2001 unfolded, military missions increased again as we began to fight terrorism at home and abroad. As President Bush announced we were at war against terrorism and those who harbor terrorists, we continued to commit military forces to deterrence, peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. Today, more forces are deployed than ever before from all branches of the Army, Active -approximately 7000 in Afghanistan, 45, 000 in South West Asia (SWA); Army National Guard (ARNG) and United States Army Reserves 
REQUIREMENTS OF THE QDR

After his inauguration in Jan 2001, President George W. Bush charged the Department of
Defense to "establish a new strategy for America's security that would embrace uncertainty and contend with surprise". The strategy was built around four key goals:
"Assuring: … The Nation will honor its obligations…be a reliable security partner…willingness to use force in its own defense and that of others…promote security cooperation …deter aggression or coercion, Dissuading: Through its strategy and actions, …influences the nature of future military competitions, channels threats…military planning for potential adversaries…well targeted strategy and policy can therefore dissuade other countries from initiating future military competitions.
Deterring: A multifaceted approach…wider range of military options to discourage aggression…emphasis on peacetime forward deterrence in critical areas of the world…modest reinforcement from outside the theater…non-nuclear forces that can strike with precision at fixed and mobile targets…active and passive defenses; and rapidly deployable and sustainable forces that can defeat any adversary.
Decisively defeating: …maintain the capability to support treaty obligations and defeat the efforts of adversaries".
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The President also determined that the U.S. military needed to transition from a "threatbased" force to a "capabilities-based" force. The previous QDR, (1997) , was designed to retaliate against a specific adversary in a specific location. 6 The capabilities-based model is designed around four assumptions: First, we do not know what nation, nations or non-state actors will pose a threat to those vital U.S. interests or to our allies' and friends' interests decades from now. Second, the model focuses on how an adversary might fight rather than where he will fight. The third is identifying those capabilities the U.S. military will need to deter and defeat adversaries who will rely on surprise, deception and asymmetric warfare. Finally, it requires the military to focus on emerging opportunities like remote sensing, long-range precision strike and transformed maneuver and expeditionary forces and systems.
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The QDR and National Security Strategy (NSS) cite the goals of "promoting global security; work to bring the hope of democracy; and build a world that trades in freedom and therefore grows in prosperity". 8 The NSS is based on an American internationalism that reflects the union of our values and national interests. The overarching strategic intent is not only to make the world safer, but also to make it better. The NSS promotes political and economic freedom, peaceful relations, and respect for human dignity. The military supports NSS goals in at least four ways: strengthening military alliances to defeat global terrorism (objectives one and two); working with others to defuse regional conflicts (objectives one, two and four); preventing our enemies from threatening us, our allies and friends with weapons of mass destruction (objectives one and two); and transforming America's national security institutions to meet the challenges and opportunities of the twenty-first century (objective four). 9 The Army's support of these goals in the near future will affect our force structure, the make-up and use of reserve forces and our ability to respond to small-scale crises. Does the Army, in fact, have the current capability to support QDR and NSS objectives?
GUIDANCE OF QDR
The Administration approached the force-planning task aware of the need to provide over time a richer set of military options across the operational spectrum than is currently available and to ensure that forces have the means to adapt in time to surprise. The envisioned forcesizing construct specifically shaped forces to:
10
• Deter aggression and coercion forward in critical regions.
[4]
• Swiftly defeat aggression in overlapping major conflicts [2] while preserving for the President the option to call for a decisive victory in one of these conflictsincluding the possibility of regime change or occupation.
[1]
• Defend the United States.
• Conduct a limited number of smaller-scale contingency operations (SSC). The USAF has requested assistance from the Army in guarding facilities in the U.S. and
overseas. An agreement was recently reached between the two services which permit airmen to return to civilian status after having served on active duty for one year.
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The other services have also seen their deployments increase over the past few years. The Army has been committed to the extent that it might not be able to accomplish all its missions without unacceptable risk. In years past it would rely on the National Guard and
Reserves for assistance. Today, and most likely in the future, they may not be available since the Army is currently deploying the ARNG and USAR forces as much as it is the active force. It is not clear that the QDR anticipated an increase in the numbers of SSC's. The QDR and NSS have thus failed to keep pace with the uncertainties of the global security environment. Further, the Administration itself seems reluctant to re-prioritize the nation's strategic commitments. The
Department of Defense must reprioritize the Army's missions, or increase the overall endstrength of the Army.
STRATEGIC PRIORITIES
"Our Nation's cause has always been larger than our Nation's defense. We fight, as we always fight, for a just peace -a peace that favors liberty. We will defend the peace against the threats from terrorists and tyrants. We will preserve the peace by building good relations among the great powers. And we will extend the peace by encouraging free and open societies on every continent. Prevent conflict and unwarned attacks, and Prevail against adversaries in a wide range of possible contingencies, today and tomorrow. 24 Fully supporting these objectives is the job of our current military. As usual, the Army's burden is heavy.
IMPACT OF GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM
The President has made it clear that the Global War on Terrorism is the number one mission of the U.S. military and government. Some might argue that these two countries would never unite. However, should the U.S. attack
Iraq for violating UN resolution 1441, there is a possibility that Iraq will try to build a coalition, claiming that the U.S. is trying to become a hegemony in the region. We may see these two forces join together to fight the U.S. with the domination of the region at stake. A more likely scenario is that Iran will let Iraq fight its war with the U.S., anticipating that if Iraq is defeated, then Iran will become the regional hegemony.
North Korea has the world's third largest army (approximately 1 million active duty soldiers and a reserve force numbering over 6 million). Seventy percent of its active force, including equipment is operating within 100 miles of the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) -most of it within hardened underground facilities. The force could quickly launch an attack against the 2d U.S. COA 1
Analysis
The decision to rely on COA 1 rest on three dubious assumptions. The Army will be able to transform as scheduled with little to no distraction; it will not be committed to any other deterrence missions. The Army will be able to restructure the active, ARNG and USAR forces to meet new challenges. SSCs will be limited in number or size of force committed.
To continue its transformation program, the Army must commit approximately one-third to one-quarter of the force to testing, fielding, and training. These units will be unavailable for would also require additional changes within the personnel assignment process; it would also shorten tours at CONUS installations. To limit the new forward deployed force to a brigade size would be easier on the personal assignment side; it would not have as large of an impact on the current length of CONUS tours.
The second assumption is that DOD will be allowed to make the necessary adjustments to the force structure of the active, ARNG and USAR forces to meet the current and projected However, many of the USAR units have deployed in support of SSCs and deterrence missions.
The heavy CSS structure of the USAR and the need for their critical low-density high demand MOS's have identified them for call-up. Elements of the ARNG and USAR need to be restructured to fill short MOS's that do not require extensive specialized schooling such as military police, transportation, communication, and civil affairs -to mention just a few specialties.
Over the long haul, it would be wise to select some ARNG units to get schooling in specialized areas. Army education programs could prepare them.
This dual restructuring will enhance defense of our homeland, President Bush's highest priority and the third objective of the QDR. Too many of our USAR low density high-demand MOS's are the same people that local, state and federal agencies are depending on to be the first responders should another terrorist attack hit our homeland. Some laws excuse these citizen soldiers from serving should their units be activated. DOD must therefore ensure that we have the right numbers and MOS's in all components of our armed forces to prevent any potential shortages.
Will the administration or DOD clearly define and place a limit on the number of SSCs or establish a maximum force size capacity? Today there are more than 13,000 soldiers deployed under the category SSC in locations like the Balkans, Sinai, Africa, Philippines, and South America, to name a few. 36 Since 1989 the Army's end strength has been cut by more than 34% and civilian strength cut by 42%, while the mission rate has increased by 300%. With the current limits on the size of the Army and the current world threats, the Army is becoming hard-pressed to deter aggression forward with a force much larger than a brigade.
Should the need arise to send a division forward to deter aggression in SWA, the Army will need to weigh the cost of this against its benefits. One of the costs might be a second one-year, unaccompanied tour, like the current Korean tour is. This may impact on retention in the active, ARNG and USAR units. The Secretary of Defense has stated that we have the force structure to defeat aggression in overlapping conflicts (objective two), but no one seems to consider the effect on the force of a hardship tour to Turkey or some other SWA country.
The second risk may be reduced by creative restructuring of the force. The Secretary of Defense may not be able to restructure the active ARNG and USAR as he sees fit. Congress and state governors will also influence the outcome. As the Secretary of Defense has frequently noted, several critical CSS capabilities found only in the USAR need to be moved disaster in the near future as our deployments continue to increase and we overcommit our low density-high demand soldiers, or as they get exemptions from serving due to their first response status within their states. Will we be capable of deploying the necessary forces to fight overlapping conflicts knowing that we do not have some critical CSS assets?
The third risk comes from over committing to SSCs. The U.S. Army remains every where it has fought: In Europe since WWII ended in 1945; in Korea since 1953 and counting. Army soldiers have been in the Balkans for almost eight years and do not appear to be leaving any time soon. The Army has forces deployed in over 120 locations worldwide, maintaining a military presence in many locations year round. 38 As these SSCs increase, as they are likely to do in the emerging strategic environment, so do the stabilization forces. In the past, this mission was primarily an active force mission. Today however, theis demand has increased so much that the citizen soldiers of the ARNG and USAR are now pulling these missions.
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COA2
Analysis
Recent world events (Iraq violating U.N. Resolution 1441, North Korea developing nuclear weapons, and the threat of terrorism world wide) have led to much debate among top military and elected officials. The General Accounting Office has assessed the need to increase the Army's end strength in order to accomplish DOD objectives. An increase of somewhere between 30,000 and 50,000 is supported not only by CSA Eric Shinseki and endorsed by Senator Max Cleland (D-GA) and Congressman Ike Skelton (D MO). 40 If the active force of 480,000 is increased by 40,000, the new total of 512,000 would enable the active force to deter forward better as well as relieve the ARNG from participating in SSCs, for which they are called to active duty for approximately eight months, six of which they are deployed.
The Association of the United Sates Army's (AUSA) Institute of Land Warfare (ILW) has conducted a study showing how SSC impact the force. They have determined that Army end strength is low and additional forces are needed. The AUSA is certainly pro-military so we would be surprised if they did not want more soldiers in the Army. Even so, their study is relevant, and it depicts an accurate estimate of daily available forces. The study reveals a ratio of three or four soldiers impacted for every one deployed. This takes into consideration the reduction in combat readiness of the deploying unit, units used to conduct the deploying unit's training, additional units from within a division or Corps who provide the key low-density MOS' to fill critical gaps, and finally, the unit that is currently deployed. Current legislation limits Army end-strengths to approximately 480,000 soldiers on active duty. AUSA estimates, however, that only approximately 293,000 are available on any given day for deployment. The need for additional forces are further supported by the fact the Army will undergo transformation in the upcoming years. While the Army does not know exactly how large the transformed units will be, we do know that the force will be lighter in weight and transportable by air. Additionally, we expect that during transformation approximately one-third to one-quarter of the force will be non-deployable except in a worse-case scenario. As specified in the QDR our military forces must be prepared to deter forward and conduct limited SSCs. But we do not know how many missions will be assigned. With increased terrorism and threats to U.S. allies, the U.S. is expected to lead the way. This requires soldiers on the ground in many MOS'. The need for additional active duty CSS assets will increases with every new mission the Army undertakes. We can no longer count on our reserve forces to handle this mission alone. They are already stressed by on-going missions.
To support Objective Three, the ARNG and USAR are probably best suited for this task.
As the Department of Homeland Security (HLS) and NORTHCOM continue to grow in size and take on more missions, their interactions with local state and federal agencies will continue to improve. 45 The active force does not have the required personnel to conduct all the SSCs that our elected officials have committed us to. An increase in the overall Army endstrength would enable the active force to accomplish most of these missions, while requiring fewer deployments for our citizen soldiers. On average, it takes our reserve forces three to four weeks to be ready to deploy. We are asking in most cases that our reserve forces prepare with little special preparation to conduct difficult unfamiliar missions when we commit them to many of these SSC missions.
Risk
In this COA the risk is low. With the restructuring of the Army, there exists the chance that Objective One and Objective Four could increase in numbers. Should the U.S. invade Iraq,
there is a good chance we will have soldiers there for an undetermined number of years. As stated earlier, the number of SSCs has increased 300% over the past ten years and indications show that rate may increase with the current world environment; (war on terrorism, violation of U.N. resolution 1441, North Korea's nuclear production threats, and the increase fighting between Israel and Palestine). With a restructuring of the Army, more CSS units to active duty, the active force would not have a problem accomplishing these increased missions.
RECOMMENDATION:
The administration should adopt COA 2 and increase the Army's end strength by 40,000.
It should also re-look the QDR, NMS and NSS and compare the explicit and implied missions against the Army's available force structure. At a minimum, the Army needs approximately 40,000 additional soldiers to fill critical low-density MOS's within all three components. The three components must be restructured to get the correct mix of low-density MOS's on active duty, as well as in the reserves. ARNG and USAR forces are best suited for the Homeland Defense missions. Their interface with local, state and federal agencies gives them an added advantage. Further, the nation's strategic reserve (active duty light force) could as determined by the President.
As a war with Iraq approaches and tensions increase in North Korea we must determine whether we have the necessary force structure to support the four QDR objectives. The Bush
Administration's QDR assumes we have the available forces to deter aggression forward; to defeat aggression in overlapping conflicts with a decisive victory in one and a possible regime change or occupation; to defend the United States; and to conduct a limited number of SSCs.
Are these valid assumptions?
Since the QDR was released in October 2001, the Administration has indicated repeatedly that DOD has the necessary forces to accomplish the largest of the objectives, defeat aggression in overlapping conflicts. A year ago, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated that we did not have the necessary forces or aircraft to defeat two regional foes simultaneously. 
